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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from a final order of a United States 
Magistrate, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  That order affirmed a 
decision of a hearing examiner for the appellee Virgin Islands 
Employment Security Agency, Unemployment Insurance Service 
(within the Virgin Islands Department of Labor) (“Agency”), which 
in turn had reversed an initial determination awarding 
unemployment benefits to appellant Cheryl Serrant.  The hearing 
examiner also authorized the Agency to recoup previously paid 
benefits from Serrant.   It is the latter decision, also affirmed 
by the Magistrate Judge, that is challenged on this appeal.  For 
the reasons that follow, we reverse. 
 
 I 
 On April 24, 1990, Serrant was employed at Point 
Pleasant Beach Resort as a reservations clerk.  According to the 
hotel management, Serrant was discharged because she refused to 
prepare an “advance occupancy report.”  According to the hearing 
examiner, acting on the appeal of the hotel from the initial 
award of benefits, Serrant’s actions leading to her dismissal 
constituted misconduct within the meaning of 21 V.I.C. § 
304(b)(3), thereby resulting in her disqualification for 
  
unemployment insurance benefits under that section.1  While 
Serrant maintains that her actions did not constitute wilful 
misconduct within the meaning of the statute, a position that may 
have merit, the facet of the hearing examiner’s decision dealing 
with denial of benefits is not challenged on this appeal.  
Rather, we consider only the portion of the hearing examiner’s 
decision dealing with recoupment. 
 The recoupment holding was predicated on 24 V.I.C. § 
305(j)(2), which provides: 
  If the Commissioner of Labor finds, within the 
two-year period following payment to any individual of 
any amount as benefits under this chapter, that such 
individual is not entitled, by reason other than that 
specified in subsection (h)(2) or subsection (j)(1) 
above, to such amount, he shall repay such amount to 
the Commissioner of Labor for the Unemployment Fund or 
in the absence of such repayment such amount shall be 
deducted from any future benefits payable to him under 
this chapter, within the two-year period following the 
date of notice of the final determination or decision; 
Provided, That no repayment or deduction from benefits 
shall be required under this paragraph if the amount 
overpaid was received by the individual without fault 
on his part, and such recoupment would be against 
equity and good conscience. 
(emphasis added). 
                     
1
.  24 V.I.C. § 304(b)(3) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 (b)  An insured worker shall not be disqualified for 
writing week credits or benefits for any week of his 
unemployment unless with respect to such week the 
Director finds that: 
  
 (3) he was discharged for misconduct connected with his 
most recent work . . . . 
  
 The hearing examiner’s rationale for authorizing 
recoupment is contained in the following paragraph of his 
opinion: 
 It is clear that recoupment or denial of future 
benefits is warranted in the instant case.  This 
Claimant was awarded benefits where she was at fault.  
She was terminated because of her own misconduct.  
Section 305(j)(2) allows the Agency to elect to recover 
the benefits paid to a claimant or to deny future 
benefits.  This case provides an instance where that 
election must be made.  The Commissioner must determine 
which is appropriate.  The Act offers no guidance on 
this point.  It allows the Commissioner to do either as 
a matter of discretion. 
 The case then came on Writ of Review, 5 V.I.C. § 1421 
and 5 V.I.C. app. V Rule 11(a), before the Magistrate Judge.  His 
resolution of the issue was equally terse.   After quoting § 
305(j)(2) he stated: 
  The hearing examiner’s rationale was that it was 
because of Petitioner’s misconduct, which is an 
intentional act, that she was dismissed and that, 
therefore, since it was ultimately determined that the 
benefits were received through Petitioner’s fault, she 
must repay the Agency. 
 
  In reviewing, this determination by the hearing 
examiner, this court finds that the decision is 
supported by a rational basis, and, therefore, cannot 
be disturbed. 
The Magistrate Judge therefore affirmed the hearing examiner’s 
decision.  Because our own holding turns on questions of the 
interpretation and application of law, our review of the 




 The key terms in § 305(j)(2) (for purposes of this 
appeal) are “without fault,” and “equity and good conscience.”  
Unfortunately, neither the hearing examiner nor the Magistrate 
Judge devoted much attention to the meaning of these terms, or to 
the record as it might bear on them.  That may well be due to the 
fact that the parties directed the attention of these 
administrative and judicial officers primarily to the misconduct 
issue, and there was little, if anything, placed in the record 
relative to fault and “equity and good conscience.” 
 A 
 Turning first to the meaning of the phrase “without 
fault,” the threshold question is the extent to which it is 
informed by the terms of § 305(j)(1).  That section provides: 
  (j)(1) Any person who makes, or causes to be made 
by another, a false statement or representation of a 
material fact, knowing it to be false or knowingly 
fails, or causes another to fail, to disclose a 
material fact, and as a result thereof has received any 
amount as benefits under this chapter to which he was 
not entitled shall, in the discretion of the 
Commissioner of Labor, be liable to repay such amount 
to the Commissioner of Labor for the Unemployment Fund 
or to have such amount deducted from any future 
benefits payable to him under this chapter within the 
two-year period following the date of notice of the 
final determination, redetermination or decision. 
 
Serrant argues that the fault necessary to subject one to 
recoupment is that specified in § 305(j)(1), that is, making 
misrepresentations to receive benefits.  This approach makes 
eminent sense.  It is also consistent with the most similar 
provision we have found, a Wyoming regulation set forth in the 
  
margin,2 which also defines fault principally in terms of 
considerations that bear on fault in making the application for 
benefits. 
 If § 305(j)(1) were controlling, Serrant’s position 
would be strong because there is no administrative or judicial 
finding that she made any kind of misrepresentation to obtain 
benefits.  However, § 305(j)(2) by its terms appears not to apply 
where the person received benefits to which he or she was not 
entitled by reasons specified in (j)(1).  Section 305(j)(2) 
therefore seems to contemplate a situation where a claimant 
receives benefits through his or her own fault but not by means 
                     
2
.  Fault Criteria.  In determining whether a claimant is without 
fault for purposes of deciding whether to waive recovery of 
overpaid benefits under [Wyo. Stat.] § 27-3-409, the Division 
shall consider the following criteria: 
  (a)  Whether the claimant made an incorrect 
statement of facts of a material nature in order to 
collect benefits; or 
  (b)  Whether the claimant knew or should have 
known that the statement he gave the Division was 
incorrect; or 
  (c)  Whether the claimant failed to disclose or 
caused another person to fail to disclose a material 
fact in connection with a claim for benefits; or 
  (d)  Whether the claimant knew or should have 
known the fact not disclosed was material; or 
  (e)  Whether the claimant knew or should have 
known he was not entitled to benefits; or 
  (f)  Whether the overpayment resulted directly or 
indirectly, in whole or part, from some other erroneous 
act or omission of the claimant, which he knew or 
should have known was wrong; or 
  (g)  Any other relevant factor. 
 
Div. of Unemployment Ins., Dep’t of Employment, Rules and 
Regulations, ch. XXXII, § 1 (1990). 
  
of what are essentially misrepresentations as described in 
(j)(1). 
 But this conclusion is quite problematic, for it is 
difficult to identify such a scenario.  Indeed, if the (lamented) 
construction is correct, hearing examiners would, as Serrant 
contends, and as the hearing examiner and Magistrate Judge did 
here, be likely to conflate the facts to be considered in 
connection with the unemployment benefit application process 
under § 305(j) (i.e., the putative misconduct) with the work-
related conduct relevant to the determination of disqualification 
for benefits under 24 V.I.C. § 304(b)(3).  This seems dubious 
inasmuch as these are discrete statutory provisions and appear to 
serve different purposes.  For example, if there is no 
misconduct, there is no overpayment.  However, if there is 
misconduct, and that automatically was deemed fault in receipt of 
benefits, a recipient who was denied benefits for misconduct 
would, in view of the conjunctive wording of the recoupment 
provision,3 always be subject to recoupment regardless of the 
background circumstances and the dictates of equity and good 
conscience.  We doubt that the legislature intended such an 
untoward result. 
                     
3
.  The language reads (with emphasis supplied): 
 
 . . . provided, that no repayment or deduction from 
benefits shall be required under this paragraph if the 
amount overpaid was received by the individual without 
fault on his part, and such recoupment would be against 
equity and good conscience.   
  
 But then what does § 305(j)(2) mean?  What additional 
or different conduct (other than misrepresentation to obtain 
benefits) transforms being disqualified for benefits due to work-
related misconduct into receiving overpayment through fault of 
one’s own?  That is far from clear.  Moreover, § 305(j)(2) 
exempts from recoupment not individuals who applied for benefits 
through no fault of their own, but those who received them 
without fault.  This distinction seems opaque, and leads us to 
doubt that these provisions really fit together.4  Taking the 
statute at its most literal meaning, however, Serrant was not at 
fault in receiving the benefits.  She received them as the result 
of an order of the (appellee) Agency, and there is no finding 
that, at the time she received them, she had done anything 
blameworthy in connection with their receipt.  Even the work-
related misconduct finding came months later, at the time of the 
hearing examiner’s decision.  In short, Serrant’s failing to 
complete the occupancy report for the hotel does not render her 
later receipt of benefits due to Agency order to be through fault 
of her own. 
 B 
 The meaning of “equity and good conscience” probably 
favors Serrant's position even more strongly.  The terms are not 
defined in any Virgin Islands Regulation, but similar provisions 
in other jurisdictions make clear that equity and good conscience 
                     
4
.  We leave clarification to the Virgin Islands legislature, 
which might be well advised to look at the problems we have 
identified. 
  
relate to the ability of the recipient to repay the debt without 
experiencing hardship.  See 20 C.F.R. § 10-323: 
 (a)  Recovery of an overpayment is considered to be 
“against equity and good conscience” when an individual 
presently or formerly entitled to benefits would 
experience severe financial hardship in attempting to 
repay the debt . . . . 
See also International Union, UAW v. Dole, 919 F.2d 753, (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (financial hardship is key factor in interpretation 
and consideration of “equity and good conscience” as used in 20 
C.F.R. § 617.55(a)(2)(ii)(A), concerning recoupment of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance benefits); Giles v. Director of Labor, 621 
S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ark. App. 1981) (Corbin, J., concurring) (“[O]ne 
factor in determining equity and good conscience is the financial 
condition of the claimant.”); Gilles v. Department of Human 
Resources Development, 521 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1974) (considering 
“whether recovery of the overpayment, by imposing extraordinary 
hardship on the claimant, would tend to defeat the objectives of 
the Unemployment Insurance Code.”); Section 2 of the Wyoming 
Regulations cited above.5  We believe that the Virgin Islands 
                     
5
.  Section 2.  Equity and Good Conscience and Defeats the 
Purpose of the Act Criteria.  In determining whether recovery of 
an overpayment defeats the purpose of the Employment Security Law 
or is against equity and good conscience for the purpose of 
deciding whether the overpayment of benefits shall be waived, the 
Division shall consider the following criteria: 
 (a)  The extent to which recovery of the overpayment 
would create an extreme financial hardship on the claimant.  
Extreme financial hardship as used herein means the claimant 
would be unable to provide himself or his immediate family with 
minimal necessities of food, clothing, medicine, and shelter as a 
result of the Division recovering the overpayment.  Extreme and 
lasting financial hardship may be expected to endure for more 
than 120 days. 
  
statute carries with it a similar meaning.  There is no 
indication in the record, that Serrant, who has been granted 
leave to proceed in this case in forma pauperis, has an ability 
to repay the sums she has received.  There is not only no fact 
finding contra but nothing in the record from which any such 
finding could be inferred.  And while we acknowledge that there 
may be “other relevant factors,” see supra note 4, none have been 
suggested as being applicable here.   
 
 III 
 In view of the foregoing, it appears from the record 
that, had the hearing examiner and Magistrate Judge focused on 
the pertinent issue, they would have determined that any 
overpayment received by Serrant was received without fault on her 
part, and further, that any recoupment would have to be deemed 
against equity and good conscience.  Repayment of benefits is 
therefore not required.  The fact that Serrant was found to have 
been guilty of wilful misconduct in terms of the benefit 
entitlement ruling does not affect this result.6 
(..continued) 
 (b)  The extent to which an agent of the Division made 
an error which contributed to causing the overpayment of 
benefits.  However, such an error shall not include making a 
decision to pay benefits which was reversed through the appeals 
process. 
 (c)  Any other relevant factor, provided the claimant 
is without fault. 
6
.  In light of our disposition, we do not address Serrant’s 
contention that the doctrine of equitable estoppel would prohibit 
the Agency from recouping the overpayment of benefits due to the 
Agency’s seven-month delay in issuing a final decision reversing 
her award of benefits. 
  
 The order of the district court, therefore, will be 
reversed, and the case remanded with the directions to vacate the 
order for recoupment. 
